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 2 
Throughout most of the fourth century AD, the Christian church struggled with 
the Arian controversy. This conflict was a debate over whether Jesus Christ was 
very God of very God or something less than God. Indeed, this controversy can 
be seen as the culmination of the church trying to come to terms with her belief 
in one God who is three persons. From her beginning, the church always 
confessed belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but how these persons were 
one was often the subject of debate. A major victory for the church was the 
Council of Nicea in 325, which settled on the term homoousios to describe the 
relationship between the Father and the Son: Christ is fully God because he has 
the same essence or nature as God the Father. Despite this victory, the council 
did not end the dispute; Arianism would remain a problem until the First 
Council of Constantinople in 381, which essentially ended the Arian controversy. 
During the time between these two councils, there were some who, although not 
being in full agreement with the Arians, were still not comfortable employing the 
word homoousios as they felt it blurred the distinction between the Father and the 
Son and either risked or introduced an heresy from previous centuries called 
Modalism. During this intermediate period, the task of refuting further Arian 
claims, of responding to the concerns of those who feared utilizing homoousios, 
and of refining the concepts which lie under the church’s understanding of the 
Trinity largely fell to three men known as the Cappadocian Fathers: Sts. Basil the 
great, his younger brother Gregory of Nyssa, and their mutual friend Gregory 
Nazianzus. It was their formulation of triadology which was codified at the First 
Council of Constantinople, and an important aspect of their methodology was 
the distinction they made between the concepts of person and nature.1 It is my 
purpose in this paper to show why such a distinction is important for theology. I 
will begin by briefly sketching the Modalist and Arian systems and demonstrate 
that, despite ultimately affirming different conclusions, one of the errors forcing 
them to their conclusions is a confounding of person and nature. Then, with St. 
Basil as our main focus, I will illustrate how a distinction between the two 
excludes mingling the persons of the Trinity (Modalism) or destroying their 
unity (Arianism) by examining what this distinction entails and how it preserves 
a balance between the oneness and multiplicity of God. 
 
In the centuries leading up to the Arian controversy, the church had to 
combat the heresies of Marcianism and Gnosticism, which both taught a 
multiplicity of gods in some form or another. As a response to these heresies, two 
                                                 
1 Throughtout this essay, I will be using the term “nature,” “substance,” and “essence” as equivalent, and 
the terms “person” and “hypostasis” as equivalent. 
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other heresies emerged: Dynamic Monarchianism2 and Modalistic 
Monarchianism. They are grouped under the name "Monarchianism" because 
they were concerned with protecting the monarchy or oneness of God.3 Our 
present concern is with the latter of these: Modalism or Sabellianism as it was 
known in the east. Although there were different nuances among the Modalists, 
they were all agreed that the terms "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit" were just 
different names for the same diving being or person, which could signify his 
different aspects or the various modes in which he presented himself; the names 
did not denote real and distinct persons. 
 
An early proponent of Modalism was Noetus of Smyrna. He taught that 
there was no distinction between the Father and Son and that one could even 
speak of the Father as being crucified. Responding to these views in a short 
treatise, St Hippolytus of Rome summarizes the reasoning of Noetus and his 
followers. After establishing from the scriptures that God is one, Hippolytus says 
that: 
 
They answer in this manner: ‘If therefore I acknowledge Christ to be God, He is the Father 
Himself, if He is indeed God; and Christ suffered, being Himself God; and consequently the 
Father suffered, for He was the Father Himself.’4 
 
As is apparent in this passage, the distinction between the names "Father" and 
"Christ” is only nominal; they both describe the same person. This lack of 
distinction is the result of failing to distinguish between person and nature, and 
such a failure is seen in the phrase: “If therefore I acknowledge Christ to be God, He is 
the Father Himself, if He is indeed God.” The necessity present in this phrase for the 
Son to be the Father suggests the notion that to be God is to be the Father: in 
order for Christ to be God, he has to be the Father as well. Implied here also is 
that if Christ is not the Father, then he is not God, but something else or of a 
different essence. Thus, the Modalists have identified or equated the Father with 
what it means to be God - the divine nature. As this reasoning shows, they think 
that the personal names are indicative of an underlying nature and not of 
something distinct from that nature. Since person is the same thing as nature, it is 
impossible for the natures of unique and numerically distinct persons to be 
ontologically the same because a distinction between persons entails a distinction 
                                                 
2 Dynamic Monarchianism is also known as Subordinationism. It is the belief that Christ was just a mere 
man whom God adopted and infused with his own power. 
3 Gonzales, Justo L. A History of Christian Thought. Volume 1 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987), 143. 
4 St. Hippolytus of Rome, Against the Heresy of One Noetus. Ante-Nicene Fathers, Volume V, p. 224. (Emphasis 
Mine). 
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between natures. Moreover, even if the natures of two (or three) persons are 
identical, the logic of this metaphysic demands that the natures are unique to 
each person, distinct from one another, and not shared; in other words, there is 
no real communion or ontological unity of persons, despite their nature being 
identical. Any attempt, therefore, to distinguish between the Father and the Son 
will result in an unsavory dilemma: Christ would either not be God because he 
would have a different nature; or, if Christ were to have a nature identical to the 
Father while remaining distinct from him, there would be two identical, but 
ontologically distinct, Fathers. Since the Modalists wanted to affirm both the 
deity of Christ and belief in one God, they were forced to conclude that the Son 
was the Father. 
 
Whereas confusing person and nature led the Modalists to identify the 
Son with the Father, the same cannot be said of the Arians: they completely cut 
him off from the Father. Arianism has its start with a fourth century Alexandrian 
priest named Arius. He and his followers believed that the Son was created by 
the will of the Father. The Son was the highest and most perfect being of all 
creation and was essentially in his own category of creature; but he was, 
nevertheless, of a different essence than God the Father and was in no way equal 
to him in divinity.5 
 
The famous opponent of the Arians during the early part of the 
controversy was the bishop of Alexandria St. Athanasius the great. In his work 
On the Synods, he preserves an epistle from Arius and his followers written to 
Alexander, who had previously been the bishop of Alexandria. In this letter, the 
Arians affirm their commitment to a belief in one God who is the Father, and 
they reject several Trinitarian heresies, including Sabellianism. They then explain 
their views: 
 
And God, being the cause of all things, is Unbegun and altogether Sole, but the Son being 
begotten apart from time by the Father, and being created and founded before ages, was 
not before His generation, but being begotten apart from time before all things, alone was 
made to subsist by the Father. For He is not eternal or co-eternal or co-unoriginate with 
the Father, nor has He His being together with the Father, as some speak of relations, 
introducing two ingenerate beginnings, but God is before all things as being Monad and 
Beginning of all.... But if the terms 'from Him,' and 'from the womb,' and 'I came forth 
from the Father, and I have come,' be understood by some to mean as if a part of Him, 
one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and 
                                                 
5 St. Athanasius the Great, De Synodis, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume IV, p. 458. 
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alterable and material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who 
is the Incorporeal God.6 
 
The first thing that should be noted is that the Arians use the terms "God" and 
"Father" interchangeably in this section and throughout the whole letter and also 
speak of both as the beginning of all, ingenerate, unbegun, eternal, sole, etc. This 
unity of the notions of God and the Father indicates that, for the Arians, the 
criterion for what it means to be God is intimately bound together with their idea 
of the Father; whatever attribute one applies to the Father will apply to God and 
vice-versa. The Arians, therefore, fail to distinguish between what it means to be 
God and what it means to be Father; both are the same. This confusion between 
person and nature is also clearly seen in their concern that if the divine nature is 
parceled out in any way, then the Father would be divided, which is to say that if 
the divine nature is partaken of, then the Father is partaken of as well. Since the 
Arians reject Modalism, they must distinguish between the Father and the Son; 
however, since they also fail to differentiate between person and nature, they are 
faced with the aforementioned dilemma: either the Son has a different essence 
and is not God; or there are two Fathers because they believe that the essence of 
God denotes a sole ingenerate monad who is the Father; and thus, if the Son has 
the same essence as the Father, then by necessity he must be a sole ingenerate 
monad like the Father. Given their commitment to belief in one God and their 
repudiation of Modalism, the Arians must confess the Son to be of a different 
essence than the Father. 
 
Having examined the systems of the Modalists and the Arians, it is clear 
that their failure to distinguish between the notions of person and nature led 
them to faulty conclusions. Since the Modalists and the Arians rightly rejected 
the existence of two Gods, they were forced to affirm that either the Father and 
Son were the same or that the Son was not God.7 They were not able to conceive 
of one God who is three persons because within the framework they are 
working, God can only be one if he is one person. Two distinct divine persons, 
even if they are equal in their divinity, would result in two distinct Gods. What 
confusing person and nature does, then, is completely exclude any real 
multiplicity in God because there is nothing that can act as a bond of unity to 
make the persons one. The task, therefore, that befell St. Basil was to disentangle 
the notions of person and nature and to provide clear and consistent definitions 
                                                 
6 Ibid, 458. (Emphasis Mine) 
7 It should be noted that, although not discussed in this paper, the reasons which the Modalists give for why 
the Son is the same as the Father and reasons which Arians give for why the Son must be of a different 
essence can also be applied to the Holy Spirit. 
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of both in order to preserve the oneness and multiplicity of God, lest the equal 
divinity of the persons or their distinctness be compromised.  
 
St. Basil the Great was archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia and was the 
eldest of the three Cappadocian Fathers. Most of his thought is contained in his 
many letters. Basil explains the distinction between person and nature most 
lucidly in his 38th letter, which he wrote to his younger brother Gregory. He 
begins with a discussion on what can be called indefinite and definite nouns. 
When ascribed to a plurality of subjects, an indefinite noun has a general 
meaning and denotes something vague and uncircumscribed. This “general 
thing” is what Basil understands as a nature or essence. The word "man," for 
instance, is ambiguous and indefinite; it indicates not a particular man or 
individual, but the human nature all men hold in common. A definite noun, 
however, is just the opposite: it does not denote something general, but 
something limited, specific, and circumscribed. This “particular thing” is what 
Basil understands as an hypostasis or person. For instance, the name "Peter" 
refers not to the common nature he shares with Paul (or any other man), but to a 
particular individual who can be distinguished from other individuals by certain 
characteristics. In fine, nature refers to what is under consideration, and person 
refers to who. Both are two different concepts. Despite such a sharp distinction, 
however, person and nature are closely related. Basil elegantly summarizes this 
point: 
 
This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite conception of the 
essence or substance, which, because what is signified is general, finds no “standing,” but 
the conception which by means of the expressed peculiarities gives standing and 
circumscription to the general and uncircumscribed.8 
 
Thus, a nature cannot exist apart from an hypostasis; it needs something to 
“stand under” it. This is not to say, however, that the hypostasis is the nature; 
but rather, it is the unique and concrete subsistence of the nature, which is 
localized and known by certain properties.  
 
Moreover, there is a further aspect of this distinction that needs to be 
considered: the difference between what can be called personal properties and 
natural attributes. The former are those characteristics by which one hypostasis is 
distinguished from another. These properties say nothing about the common 
essence which is shared, and all the characteristics of one hypostasis will not be 
                                                 
8 St. Basil the Great, Letter XXXVIII, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume VIII, p. 137-138. 
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identical to those of another hypostasis. For example, Peter and Paul both share 
the same nature as all men; however, one thing that distinguishes them from 
other men is that they are apostles. Although they share this distinguishing 
feature, there are others which only they posses: Peter was the first bishop of 
Rome, and Paul was God's chosen vessel to the gentiles. What this means is that 
since such characteristics are not ascribable to all men, they are not general and 
not ascribable to human nature; thus, these traits do not define what it means to 
be man, nor are they the person himself; instead, they help circumscribe and 
point to a specific nature subsisting - the who under consideration. The latter are 
those attributes which describe a common nature. These attributes are applicable 
without qualification to all hypostases sharing the same essence, but they do not 
touch upon the hypostases themselves. As Peter and Paul are both unique 
hypostases circumscribing human nature, they both possess the totality of that 
nature; one is not more human than the other. The human nature which Peter 
possess, for instance, includes a body, soul, spirit, etc. Since Paul is a man, the 
same description will apply to him as well. These properties of human nature do 
not extend into the conception of person because they are not traits specific to 
either Peter or Paul, but are shared by all men. They are describing what Peter 
and Paul are, not who they are. Therefore, since a nature and its attributes are 
common, a person, by dint of being unique and having peculiars properties, is 
more than just his nature and is not reducible to it. 
 
Having establish what the distinction between person and nature is, Basil 
then turns to how it applies to Trinitarian theology: 
 
Transfer, then, to the divine dogmas the same standard of difference which you 
recognize in the case both of essence and of hypostasis in human affairs, and you will not 
go wrong. Whatever your thought suggests to you as to the mode of the existence of the 
Father, you will think also in the case of the Son, and in like manner too of the Holy 
Ghost.... For the account of the uncreate and of the incomprehensible is one and the same 
in the case of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. For one is not more 
incomprehensible and uncreate than another. And since it is necessary, by means of the 
notes of differentiation, in the case of the Trinity, to keep the distinction unconfounded, 
we shall not take into consideration, in order to estimate that which differentiates, what 
is contemplated in common, as the uncreate, or what is beyond all comprehension, or 
any quality of this nature; we shall only direct our attention to the enquiry by what 
means each particular conception will be lucidly and distinctly separated from that 
which is conceived of in common.9 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid, 138. 
 8 
In other words, whatever is predicated upon the Trinity must first be examined 
to see if it can be applied to all three persons, that is, whether it is a natural 
attribute or a personal property. Qualities such as incomprehensibility and 
uncreateness are attributes of the divine nature and describe what the persons are 
- their "mode of existence" - not who they are; and as such, they apply to each 
hypostasis simultaneously and equally. Because the attributes of the divine 
nature describe a completely different concept, they are not counted among the 
"notes of differentiation" or personal properties and therefore cannot aid in 
distinguishing the persons. Likewise, these notes of differentiation do not enter 
into the concept of essence. As Basil explains: 
 
Wherefore in the communion of the substance we maintain that there is no mutual approach 
or intercommunion of those notes of indication perceived in the Trinity, whereby is set forth the 
proper peculiarity of the Persons delivered in the faith, each of these being distinctively 
apprehended by His own notes. Hence, in accordance with the stated signs of indication, 
discovery is made of the separation of the hypostases...10 
 
Since these personal characteristics are not present in the common essence, they 
are not shared; and unlike the notes of differentiation among men, which, 
although they are not natural attributes can still be shared (such as apostleship), 
those applied to the Trinity are exclusive to each hypostasis and are his own. A 
person can only be discovered or recognized by looking at what traits are 
peculiar to him. Thus, when considering the three persons or the divine nature, 
the personal properties and natural attributes must be contemplated apart from 
each other. 
 
Among these unique characteristics of the persons in the Trinity, Basil 
gives the following three: the Father derives his hypostasis from no cause or is 
ingenerate; the Son is begotten by the Father; and the Holy Spirit proceeds from 
the Father.11 A more general way of stating and summarizing these personal 
properties, as Basil does in another letter, is that they are "Fatherhood, Sonship, 
and the power to sanctify.”12 Having established how person and nature are 
distinct and what the notes of differentiation are, Basil is able to exclude what it is 
to be the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from what it is to be God. For example, the 
properties inherent in “Fatherhood,” such as ingenerateness and producing the 
Son and Holy Spirit, are peculiar to one hypostasis – the Father; and they point to 
who he is, and not what his essence is. Since all three are unique hypostasis, they 
                                                 
10 Ibid, 139. (Emphasis Mine). 
11 Ibid, 138-139. 
12 St. Basil the Great, Letter CCXIV, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume VIII, p. 254. 
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cannot define the divine nature, and therefore, they can possess a nature that is 
one and ontologically the same. 
 
Although it is not Basil’s primary concern in this letter to deal with how 
the three persons are one God, he does offer a few explanations, and it will be 
beneficial to touch upon them before concluding. Since the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit are distinct persons, the unity share is not one of person, but of essence. 
They are so unified in their being that there is no interval or void between them 
which separates them spatially or consecutively from each other. If one mentions 
the Holy Spirit, he automatically apprehends the Father and the Son since the 
Spirit is of the Father and belongs to the Son; and one has received the Father 
and the Spirit if he has received the Son because the Son cannot be separated 
from whom he has his origin and his own Spirit. Likewise: 
 
He who receives the Father virtually receives at the same time both the Son and the 
Spirit; for it is in no wise possible to entertain the idea of severance or division, in such a 
way as that the Son should be thought of apart from the Father, or the Spirit be disjoined 
from the Son.13 
 
This unity between the persons is such that, when one perceives, mentions, or 
receives any one person, then the other two are perceived, mentioned, or 
received instantly as well. In a certain sense, each person is somehow present 
within the other two without actually being the other two so that they function as 
one person while remaining distinct and retaining their peculiar properties. At 
this point it might be helpful to contrast this notion of unity with our previous 
example of Peter and Paul. Although Peter and Paul are one and unified insofar 
as they possess a common nature, Peter is not present in Paul; and when one 
thinks of Peter, he does not necessarily think of Paul. Both men exist separately 
and are able to be conceived of separately. Nevertheless, there is, as Basil implies, 
a certain tension between the unity and multiplicity in the Trinity that must be 
balanced: 
 
But the communion and the distinction apprehended in Them are, in a certain sense, 
ineffable and inconceivable, the continuity of nature being never rent asunder by the 
distinction of the hypostases, nor the notes of proper distinction confounded in the community of 
essence. Marvel not then at my speaking of the same thing as being both conjoined and 
parted, and thinking as it were darkly in a riddle, of a certain new and strange conjoined 
separation and separated conjunction.14 
 
                                                 
13 St. Basil the Great, Letter XXXVIII, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume VIII, p.139. 
14 Ibid, 139. (Emphasis Mine). 
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This tension can only be balanced by keeping the categories of person and nature 
separate; yet, as Basil concedes, how this “conjoined separation and separated 
conjunction” function together is still, ultimately, a mystery. 
 
By distinguishing between person and nature and removing the notion of 
“Fatherness” from the divine essence, Basil has cut to the heart of the problem 
inherent in Modalism and Arianism. As was seen, the Arians and the Modalists 
both failed to balance the tension mentioned above because they thought that 
person and nature were the same thing, and that the Father, therefore, defined 
the divine essence. By supposing this metaphysic, the Modalists were forced to 
conclude that the Son was the Father, and the Arians were forced to conclude that 
the Son could not be God; the former eschewed all distinctions between the 
persons, and the latter rent asunder the unity of the persons. Both were right, 
however, to believe that God was one because there was one divine nature, but 
their confusion of person and nature led them to conclude that this meant one 
person as well. The Modalists and Arians, therefore, could not accept that both 
the Father and the Son are distinct individuals, and possess an identical nature 
that is ontologically the same. Such a view is impossible with their confusion 
between person and nature. Since a person essentially is his nature, it follows 
that even if two persons who have identical natures are distinct, then the natures 
are distinct as well. There can be no ontological unity or communion between the 
persons. The only way for there to be this kind of ontological unity among 
distinct persons is by observing the proper distinction between person and 
nature. Since person is not the same thing as nature, distinct persons do not 
entail distinct natures, and there can be a real communion and unity in the same 
essence because no one person defines or is reducible to the essence. 
 
It should not be thought, however, that the Modalists and the Arians were 
the only ones to confuse person and nature. In fact, all subsequent Trinitarian 
and Christological heresies, such as Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and 
Monothelitism, can be traced to this confusion. John of Damascus, the great 
systemazier of patristic theology, observed that “the reason for the heretics’ error 
is their saying that nature and hypostasis are the same thing.”15 The next five 
Ecumenical Councils were responses to these heresies, and their theological 
formulations were predicated upon the triadology of the Cappadocian Fathers, 
including the distinction between person and nature. It is this dependence that 
makes the distinction between person and nature all the more important. 
                                                 
15 Saint John of Damascus. Writings: The Fount of Knowledge. Trans. Frederic H. Chase. (New York: Fathers of 
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